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In what way do political parties across the European Union describe the nation and 
Europe?  Do they diverge or converge in their ways of representation?  What can 
account for variation or uniformity?  The paper explores some answers to these 
questions by providing a comparative analysis of data from the nine countries that 
took part in the EURONAT project.  Analysing representations of the nation and of 
Europe in political discourse is important since these are the images used by those 
who either are exercising power as government, or are in the position of influencing 
the government as opposition.  Representations in political discourse have more 
immediate effects on what is actually being done (mainly as policies) in relation to the 
nation and Europe. The paper first explores the images of the nation put forward by 
various political parties in the nine countries and seeks to identify any emerging 
patterns.  It then investigates the issue of Central and Eastern Europe.  It concludes 
that the ‘nation’ is an always contested concept, and that Europe is presented in a 
similar manner using a very similar vocabulary by various political parties across 
Europe.  This suggests that political parties across Europe are still operating in the 
conventional Westphalian framework which privileges nation-states over Europe.  
The continued dominance of the Westphalian framework in political discourse also 
suggests that a Europe-wide public space is yet to emerge.  
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In what way do political parties across the European Union describe the nation and 
Europe?  Do they diverge or converge in their ways of representation?  What can 
account for variation or uniformity?  Indeed, there has not been much research on this 
issue and there still remains a great deal to be discovered.  The aim of this paper is, 
therefore, not to pursue a specific set of hypothesis, but rather to explore some 
answers to these questions by providing a comparative analysis of data from the nine 
countries that took part in the EURONAT project1.   
 
Analysing representations of the nation and of Europe in political discourse is 
important since these are the images used by those who either are exercising power as 
government, or are in the position of influencing the government as opposition. 
Representations in political discourse have more immediate effects on what is actually 
being done (mainly as policies) in relation to the nation and Europe. Moreover, 
identifying the ways in which the nation and Europe are represented in political 
discourse will allow us to compare these with those images in media and ‘lay’ 
discourses.  This is one of the possible ways to gauge the relationship between the 
state, civil society and the private lives of citizens, and the paper does not pretend to 
provide the definitive answers to the questions posed at the beginning.   
 
This paper portrays the data collected by EURONAT’s nine research teams.  Each 
team was assigned to collect party platforms from the general election nearest to 2002 
and speeches made by political party leaders on the topic of Europe/the EU.  They 
were also asked to examine the parliamentary debates on the Kosovo crisis and the 
military intervention in Afghanistan as well as on the 2004 EU enlargement.  The data 
represents a wide spectrum of political orientation.  More details as to how the data 




The paper begins by exploring the images of the nation put forward by various 
political parties in the nine countries and seeks to identify any emerging patterns.  It 
then briefly investigates the issue of Central and Eastern Europe.  It concludes with 
some observations from a macro point of view. 
 
 
Representations of the nation 
 
From a macro-perspective, there is little variation in the ways in which the nation is 
represented by the political parties across the nine countries.  The specific content of 
representations of the nation varies (for instance, Polish political parties may 
emphasise the longevity of Polish history, the Catalan nationalist/autonomist 
Convergence and Union highlights the Catalan language, and the right-wing Austrian 
People’s Party tends to play up the idea of Heimat in their definitions of the respective 
nation). However, viewed together, each national setting demonstrates a similar set of 
characteristics which are used to describe the nation.  For instance, to name but a few, 
these can be civic, ethnic, cultural, historical, secular, religious aspects.  In other 
words, political parties of a particular country do not present a unified view of the 
nation along one particular axis.   
 
One major issue here is that political parties often conflate the nation and the state. 
This may be a natural consequence of the Westphalian system.  In this system, the 
central tenet of nationalism that a nation should have an independent state is held as 
paramount.  Even regionalist/nationalist parties, which are supposedly working 
against the established nation-state’s borders, appear to take this framework – the 
system based on the sovereignty of the nation-state – for granted.  In fact, this is the 
very framework that shapes these parties visions and programmes and, therefore, the 
way they talk about the nation are naturally similar to those adopted by the 
mainstream parties. Those parties which sometimes distinguish the people (the nation) 
and the state are populist or communist.  For the populist parties, such as the Radical 
Agrarian Movement in Poland, the state is often manipulated by the elite who ignore 
the interest of ordinary people. For communist parties, the state is a friend of the 
capitalists and an enemy of the people, i.e., the working class.  However, their 
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understanding of who constitutes the nation and the role it plays does not radically 
differ from those proposed by the mainstream parties.  
 
Below, we explore some differences in the ways in which the nine countries depict 
the nation in relation to Europe. Broadly based on the grounded theory analysis, the 
data will be analysed along a few themes which illuminate the political parties’ 
understanding of the power relationship.2   These themes are geography, history, 
universality through uniqueness, small vs big, progress and development and 





Reference to where one is located in the physical world is one of the surest ways of 
identifying oneself. With the exception of Poland and Spain, geography is explicitly 
used in one way or another by political parties as a device in depicting the nation.  
There are mainly two ways of using geography. The first is with reference to the 
geographical location of the nation-state. This is often employed in order to suggest 
identification of national interests with the EU’s. The second is a more metaphorical 
use to depict the nation/state in a more abstract geopolitical space.  The conflation of 
the nation and the state is inevitable in this type of representation due to the 
geopolitical implications of the physical location of the nation/state. 
 
Reference to the geographical location and its meanings 
 
The geographical location of the Czech Republic and Austria is emphasised in their 
respective political discourses. When describing the Czech Republic, and, by 
extension, the Czech nation, Czech political parties emphasise its geographical 
location, namely that it lies in the centre of the European continent.  The importance 
of the Czech Republic is articulated in its role as a bridge between Western and 
Eastern Europe. The image of a bridge has both geographical and historical 
implications.  It reflects the shared understanding amongst political parties that the 
Czechs have always been part of European civilisation in terms of culture, but that 
after World War II, politically and economically, the ties between Czechs and 
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European civilisation were severed.  With the accession to the EU, the Czechs are 
now being brought back to the centre of European civilisation.  In this representation, 
the identity of the nation-state is presented as in harmony with the European project 
mainly due to its physical location and partly because of historical legacy. 
 
A similar view is aired by Austrian political parties, especially in relation to 
Enlargement.  The Austrian People’s Party (OVP), in particular, points out that once 
the 2004 enlargement is completed, Austria’s location would move from the fringe to 
the centre of Europe. This is taken to indicate that there would be a bigger role to play 
for Austria, mainly as a state but also as a nation in an enlarged Europe.  The physical 
centrality of Austria is then projected onto the cherished Austrian tradition of 
neutrality.  Here the image of a bridge is conjured up.  In an enlarged Europe, Austria 
would literary be a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe. This would be a 
continuation of its historical mission to be a small, neutral nation between the two 
opposing blocs.  OVP further emphasises the ‘Habsburg’ cultural legacy that is 
supposed to be shared with the accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
This legacy assigns Austria with a duty to speak for the people in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  In this formulation, like in the Czech case, the supposed significance of the 
nation is incorporated in the European project, thus producing a smooth and coherent 
view of the relationship between the nation/state and Europe. 
 
In German political discourse, too, references are made to the country’s geographical 
location.  Germany is portrayed as being situated in the centre of Europe, between 
Eastern and Eastern Europe as well as between Northern and Southern Europe.  
However in German discourse, this centrality is not explicitly celebrated. The 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in particular warns against using this central 
position to extend the German sphere of influence to Eastern Europe.  The centrality 
of Germany in Europe – both as the EU and the continent – is reaffirmed and 
underpins political parties’ proposals to play a leading role in Europe and in the world, 
but the way this idea is represented is markedly less triumphant than the Czech and 
Austrian cases. 
 
In Greece and Italy, too, the physical location of the respective nation/state is 
employed to project images of the nation-state. Discourses here do not revolve around 
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the centrality of Greece or Italy in Europe, but rather at being at the ‘edge’ of Europe. 
Greek political parties refer to Greece’s location in the Balkans as well as South 
Eastern Europe to explain their understanding of the role Greece is destined to play.  
The Greek state and nation is portrayed as having the mission of being a source of 
stability and peace in the troubled area (the Balkans and/or South Eastern Europe), as 
well as of being a democratic model for Turkey.  Greece’s location as the border of 
Europe/the EU gives Greece a special mission which is high on morality.  In 
producing this vision, the Greek nation-state’ interests are entwined with those of the 
EU to effect a seamless identification of the Greek vision of the future with the EU’s 
vision.   
 
The Italian political parties also employ Italy’s geographical position in detailing their 
view of the Italian nation-state to produce a similar impact.  Italy is often depicted as 
a bridge between the EU and the Mediterranean region, thereby indicating the special 
role Italy has assumed in the EU.  In this view, Italy is a beacon of civilisation to the 
under-developed or under-democratised world.  The Mediterranean world has been 
expanded to include Islamic countries since the 9/11 incident; Italy is depicted as 
having historical links with Islam in the parliamentary debate.  The image of Italy 
being a bridge between the EU and the Mediterranean world is therefore used to 
reinforce the view of Italy as a strategically important partner of the EU and an 
effective mediator.  
 
Metaphorical uses of location 
 
While political parties in the above five countries focus on the actual location of the 
respective nation-state, Hungarian political parties do not place much importance to 
Hungary’s geographical location.  In Hungarian political discourse, geography is a 
device through which to imply the incongruence of the nation and the state.  That is to 
say the existence of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries frames the 
political discourse in Hungary.  This particular use of geography was seen most 
notably during the parliamentary debates over the Kosovo crisis.  In discussing 
whether to join the NATO allies in the military action against the Serbian forces, 
concerns over the safety of and possible repercussion to the Hungarian minorities in 
Yugoslavia were repeatedly expressed.  This line of argument seems to have multiple 
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meanings.  First it clearly reminds the voters that the Hungarian nation spreads 
beyond the current border of the Hungarian state, thus making the current 
internationally agreed borders less secure and fuzzier in the political map. Secondly, it 
reminds the audience what many Hungarians might consider as a historical injustice 
done to them, namely the settlement finalised in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, 
allowing consolidation of the self-image as a victim of historical development.  
Thirdly, the extent to which the Hungarian minorities spread in the region could imply 
the ‘greatness’ of the nation in terms of its size and location – at the centre of a 
Hungarian-inhabited area, a quality that is now denied to the Hungarians.   
 
In British political discourse, the idea of ‘being at the centre’ is often mobilised.  
Britain is described as sitting in the centre of what they portray as the most important 
relationship in the world, i.e., the EU-USA relationship.  Being at the centre means 
being important and influential, which frames both the government’s and the 
opposition’s definition of Britain and the programme that Britain should follow.  The 
image of a bridge is also conjured by British political parties. Britain is the bridge 
between Europe and the US.  This is the understanding behind the claim that Britain is 
a global and efficient diplomat.  Perhaps no longer the world power, but because 
Britain is in between two power/economic blocs, political parties can present a picture 





If not geography, history is certainly a major factor in nurturing the unique 
characteristics of a nation.  Somewhat surprisingly, the uses or appeal to history as a 
device through which to describe the nation are not as prominent as geography.  This 
may be explained in reference to recent history in several countries. Spanish political 
parties tend to shy away from concentrating on the deliberation of the Spanish 
nationhood because of the long-casting shadow of Franco’s dictatorship.  German and 
Austrian political parties have a similar reason for not focusing on history as 
something that distinguishes them from others.  It is not too clear why history is not 
extensively mobilised in the Czech and Hungarian political discourses given the 
richness of material available in both countries3.   
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 Polish political discourse appears to be immersed in references to history and several 
political parties employ the historical framework in their depiction of the Polish 
nation.  The ‘1000-year’ history of the Polish state (in this case the distinction 
between the state and nation is clearly made) is used by the left-wing Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), the right-wing coalition AWS and the post-communist agrarian 
Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL).  The AWS, in particular, flags up the historical 
framework and the nation is articulated in the context of 1000 years of shared political 
experience, territory and values.  The historical context is important for the AWS 
because they believe the identity of Poland and Poles has acquired strength through 
history.  Accordingly, the Polish nation is understood as a community of roots, and 
the AWS’s representation of the Polish nation has a strong ethnic overtone in that it 
emphasises the history of living together, the language and shared values.   
 
In Greece and Italy, history or historical legacy is used with a twist to describe the 
nation’s European credential.  The Greek New Democratic Party describes Athens, 
and therefore by extension, Greece, as the place of origin of European values, namely 
democracy, dialogue, and a peaceful solution of differences.  It therefore wants the 
new European constitution to be signed in Athens to make it once again the symbolic 
place of origin for the new Europe.  The then leader of the Italian right-wing Casa 
delle libertà (CL), Berlusconi underlines the Europeanness of the Italians by claiming 
that it was the Roman Empire that devised and implemented the law and the 
institution of citizenship to create a civic body (cives romani) out of different ethnic 
groups, the very principle upon which the EU is being built.   
 
Appeal to history is frequently used in British political discourse.  Overwhelming 
majority of references to history is made to the experiences of World War II, and 
especially to Britain’s role as the sole defender of freedom and democracy against 
Nazi aggression.  The wartime achievements of Britain as well as collective guilt 
towards the victims of the holocaust are used to define British people as those who are 
committed to democracy, human rights and, above all, freedom.  The UK 
Independence Party uses this device to suggest that European integration is, therefore, 
a threat to British core values.  The mainstream parties would use this framework to 
support the image of Britain as the reformer of the EU.   
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Unique quality – claim to universal values 
 
Geography and history are two obvious criteria to make the nation distinct.  In 
addition, some political parties claimed that their respective nation/state has a unique 
quality which is, nonetheless, linked to universal values in order to elaborate their 
view of the nation within the family of nations on the globe. 
 
As mentioned above, British political parties are perhaps most vocal in claiming a 
firm link between the nation and some universal values, in this case, between the 
British nation and democracy and freedom.  The images of Britain standing alone in 
the face of advancing Nazis and Britain going to war for a principle (declaring war 
against Germany when the German army invaded Poland although ‘we could not do 
anything practical to prevent the Poles being overrun’ according to one MP) were 
repeatedly evoked most notably in the parliamentary debate over the Kosovo crisis. 
This led to the declaration that British people had a moral duty to not stand by but to 
go in, protect the innocent and punish the aggressor.  What emerges from these 
debates is a representation of the British nation as an upholder and defender of 
universal values. This makes the British nation special and unique amongst all the 
nations in Europe and in the world.  The emphasis on ‘standing alone’ in parties’ 
deliberations betrays a trace of the idea of splendid isolation.   
 
Italian political parties are, on the other hand, keen on stressing the tradition of 
humanitarianism which is seen as a uniquely Italian quality.  This was taken up by the 
Ulivo (UL) in arguing for the case of intervening in Kosovo and Albania with the 
NATO allies.  The Italian tradition of humanitarianism, reinforced by the Catholic 
tradition, dictates the course of action – not to stand by as a catastrophe unfolds, but to 
act as the humanitarian leader in sending aid and not to hesitate in participating in 
military intervention in order to stop ethnic cleansing.  This was presented as 
inherently Italian, thereby making the nation noble and respectable.  In contrast to the 
rather isolated British self-image, the notable feature of this Italian connection to 
universal values is that it translates into an image of Italy leading other nations-states, 
thereby lending itself better to the idea of co-operation. 
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Small vs Big – power and status 
 
It is not only usual ‘characteristics’ that are employed to represent the nation.  Some 
political parties employ a language of power in relation to Europe as well as the world 
in describing the nation-state.  The reference to this aspect is evident in the Czech, 
Austrian, Italian, and British cases.   
 
The Czech and Austrian political parties do not hesitate to depict their respective 
nation-state as small.  Czech political parties fear that as a result of its size, the Czech 
Republic will become a second-class member of the EU. Therefore, they insist on the 
importance of equality amongst the EU member states.  Although the importance of 
being an equal member of the EU appears both in Polish and Hungarian political 
discourses, it is not accompanied by an explicit self-portrait of a small nation-state.  
This may be due to the tendency in the Czech political discourse to equate the EU 
with a possible German dominance.  Perhaps, one of the reasons why the Czechs are 
less enthusiastic about the European project than the Poles and Hungarians may lie in 
this publicly shared understanding of the EU.  As if to reinforce this induction, 
Austrian political parties, on the other hand, do not express their concern over the 
status of Austria as a small nation in the EU.  This probably reflects the self-
confidence of a country in the First World, of a wealthy, established liberal 
democracy.   Austria’s size is not seen as a deterrent for it to play a prestigious role in 
the European as well as global arena.  Austria may even be able to mobilise its 
Habsburg legacy in speaking out for the nations in Eastern Europe. Hence, the 
country’s size does not undermine the confidence in the nation-state. 
 
According to various Italian political parties, Italy is defined as a player capable of 
taking up a leading role both in the world and EU.  This notion of being a ‘leader’ is 
backed up by several factors, namely its membership of NATO and G8, Italy’s 
position as a founding member of the EU and the country’s strategic importance of 
being situated in the Mediterranean basin.  This triumphant image of Italy being an 
important country is then projected on to the programmes that political parties have 
produced for Italy.  In many of these programmes, Italian national interests and the 
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EU’s interests are presented as being congruent or complementary. This, in turn, may 
underpin the higher level of identification with Europe amongst Italians.   
 
British political parties clearly define Britain as a global player, as a big nation-state.  
Their depiction is based on facts such as that of being a nuclear power, a permanent 
member of the Security Council, an influential member of NATO, a member of G8, a 
major member of the Commonwealth and a special ally of the United States.  Because 
of the prestige Britain maintains in the world and in Europe, Britain is often 
represented as a global diplomat working tirelessly to bring peace and stability in both 
Europe and the world.  It is noted that European ideals of peace and prosperity are 
aligned to British aspirations, yet this British self-image of being a global player does 
not lend itself well to enthusiastic identification of British national interests with the 




Progress and development 
 
What can be summarised as the theme of progress and development is also deployed 
in the representation of the nation-state, especially vis-à-vis Europe/the EU.  This is 
an important technique in putting forward a programme for future.  If the present 
situation is deemed to be unsatisfactory, a set of concrete actions to overcome the 
predicaments needs to be detailed.   
 
As expected, this is a theme often taken up by political parties in the accession 
countries.  In these cases, the recognition that the nation-state is somehow behind EU 
standards is subtly hinted, if not explicitly acknowledged.  In Hungary, the concern is 
expressed over the government target that Hungary has to catch up with the EU’s 
level of development by 2015.  That the Hungarian society needs catching up and EU 
membership is seen as a means of achieving this goal are officially sanctioned views.  
The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) also depicts the EU as an enabler for a 
small nation like the Czech Republic for the future.  A similar representation of the 
EU as a means to achieve an end is circulating in Poland, thereby which suggesting 
that the state of affairs for Poland is far from ideal.   
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 Greek political discourse is mostly centred around the idea of ‘underdevelopment.’ 
Greek society is depicted to engage with introspection (PASOK) or being plagued by 
misery and corruption (New Democratic Party).  As any communist party would do, 
the Greek Communist Party describes the Greek state as being not run by the Greek 
people. The coalition of the Left and the Progress Party (Synapismos) maintains that 
Greece is in need of reform in order to meet the challenges posed by globalisation.  
Although none of these parties denies the positive qualities of the Greek nation-state, 
they present a bleak assessment of the current condition of the Greek nation-state. 
This assessment is then linked to the need to be integrated in the European project 
which, according to these parties, will enhance not only the economic standing of 
Greece but also the state of civil society, democracy and human rights in Greece.  
This depiction of the Greek nation-state is, therefore, entrenched in a view of the EU 
which stresses its progressive – both economically and socially – elements, thus 
succeeding in linking Greek national interests with the success of the European 
project.   
 
The Spanish political parties use ‘Europe’ as a criterion to evaluate the current 
situation of Spain in several areas.  While the conservative People’s Party (PP) utilises 
this criterion to illustrate how well Spain is doing, the PSOE uses it like the Greek 
parties to point out the lack of progress in Spain.4  Therefore the PP may refer to the 
economic union (euro) as a chance to demonstrate Spain’s capacity to confront a 
complicated and utterly new challenge while PSOE would use the EU to highlight the 
area where Spain needs to improve.  Common with the Greek case, the EU has been 
incorporated as a positive measuring rot against which the nation/state is evaluated in 
the Spanish political discourses.  What is interesting here is that in the case of Spain 
this internalisation of the European dimension co-exists with its traditional Atlantic 





The themes explored so far are, by and large, secular in their nature.  Is religion, then, 
important at all in the representation of the nation in the beginning of the twenty-first 
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century?  Reference to Christianity as an aspect of the nationhood/statehood is found 
in a few cases.  It is absent from the British, Czech, Greek and Spanish cases which 
may suggest that political discourse is more secularised in these countries than others.   
 
Christianity is highlighted mainly by Christian democratic parties such as the CDU in 
Germany, OVP in Austria and the UL in Italy.  While these parties refer to the 
Christian tradition or the tradition of humanism - that is ultimately based on the 
development of Christianity in Europe - in order to articulate what the respective 
nation stands for, they generally refrain from defining the nation as exclusively 
Christian.  On the contrary, almost all of them are eager to be seen as inclusive (even 
the Austrian populist FPO emphasises the importance of respecting cultural diversity). 
Hence, the nation’s boundaries are not necessarily set along religious lines.  
Christianity is seen as the backbone of the ‘core values’ upon which a nation is built.  
Not surprisingly, as will be discussed below, these parties also tend to refer to 
Christianity when defining Europe as discussed later. 
 
In Hungary, the right-wing, populist Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP) 
mentions Christian morality as being part of Hungarian values. However Christianity 
does not feature too prominently in representations of Europe. In Poland, the notion 
that the Polish nation is a Christian one is explicitly expressed by parties across the 
spectrum, thereby underlying the continuing influence of religion and of Catholicism 
in particular.  Moreover, rather than used to determine who is the true Pole and who is 
not, Christianity is mobilised to illustrate the context in which ‘Polish values’ have 
been formed and maintained.  In the Polish case, the Christian aspect is carried into 
the depiction of Europe as well.  The close association between Christianity, the 
nation, and Europe facilitates an identification of Poland with Europe.  What emerges 
from this survey is a broad tendency among political parties to use religion in public 
discourse.  However, it should be noted that religion is not clearly used as the 
criterion of exclusion and on this point political parties in this study converge.  
 
It is another truism to state that identity is a relational concept and practice.  In this 
section, the analysis of the representation of the nation provided by political parties in 
the nine countries has focused on the representation of national identity vis-à-vis 
Europe/the EU.  None of the factors surveyed appear to determine the ways in which 
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national and European identities are intertwined.  Two observations can be made from 
the above discussion.  First, the ways national interests are aligned to Europe’s 
(and/or the EU’s) interests appear to be significant in conditioning the level of public 
support for the European project, and therefore the degree of identification with 
Europe.  The Spanish and Greek cases are a case in point: the degree of incorporation 
of the European dimension in public discourse is so deep that any representation of 
the nation/state is imbedded in the European context.  However, the alignment of 
national interest with the European ones is not the sufficient condition as the Czech 
case shows.  Secondly, the use of characteristics of the nation in public discourse is 
another important factor.  The geographical location, history, the link to universal 
values and so on can be employed to highlight the interconnectedness of the nation 
with European countries as found in the majority of cases, but the same dimensions 
can be deployed to emphasise the difference from others as seen in the British case. 
 
 
Representations of Europe/the EU 
 
The ways in which Europe is represented show more similarity than the ways the 
nation is described. First of all, in all nine national contexts, Europe and the European 
Union are more often than not used synonymously, thus, allowing the political parties 
to conflate two different images to aid their objectives.  Secondly, the vocabulary 
employed to talk about Europe shows a high degree of resemblance among the nine 
cases.  In the following, various representations of Europe/the EU as propagated by 
political parties are explored. 
 
Europe or the EU? 
 
‘Europe’ and the ‘EU’ are, more often than not, used as synonyms by political parties.  
However, there are some instances where the distinction between Europe and the EU 
is made in a rather implicit manner.  Interestingly, communist parties distinguish 
Europe from the EU more often than other parties.  For example, in the Czech 
Republic, the Communist Party praises ‘Europe’ for having a long history, for 
nurturing values of tolerance and respect, and describes Europe as prosperous. Europe 
is where human rights are respected and cultural diversity is found.  Moreover, it is 
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where modern science and rationalism were born and have developed.  The Party also 
appreciates Europeans for their intellectual capacity and hard work.  For the Czech 
Communist Party, the EU is a form of capitalist exploitation and symbol of social 
injustice and the US domination.  Crucially, it portrays the EU as not being capable of 
fulfilling the European ideals.  This analysis blames the EU’s perceived 
malfunctioning on the capitalist system and on multinationals, thereby exonerating the 
‘innocent’ masses.  The masses are then invited to join the Party in building an 
alternative future, a future that they deserve. The Communist Party in Italy presents a 
similar analysis contrasting an image of Europe as the cradle of civilisation, to that of 
the EU as a capitalist, neo-liberal enterprise. The implication here is that the people of 
Europe are failed by the EU, that they are wronged by the ‘system’.  Just like in the 
Czech case, they invite the ‘wronged’ people of Europe to create something better.  It 
can be deduced that for the adherers of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the distinction 
between Europe and the EU can be a useful tool when presenting their diagnosis of 
the present and their visions and programmes for the future. 
 
The distinction between Europe and the EU is also implied in some Christian 
democratic parties’ view of enlargement for instance.  The CDU and CSU in 
Germany hinted that Europe and the EU are two different things.  For them, the EU 
was not quite Europe since there are some countries which share ‘common European 
values’ but are not yet members of the EU such as Switzerland and Norway.   
Inherent to this representation is the division of labour between Europe and the EU.  
Europe is a community of values while the EU is a set of pragmatic and practical 
arrangements.  Political parties often conflate these two to suggest that the European 
project is ultimately a moral project. However, when faced with a crucial question of 
membership, some parties are prepared to put forward a more essentialised 




The most dominant representation of Europe/the EU is centred on its economic aspect.  
Many political parties, mainly on the right, portray the EU as a primarily economic 
entity.  The People’s Party (PP) of Spain represents the European integration project 
as an economic one and regards the euro as a symbol of the monetary union and the 
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common security policy.  Accordingly, the PP advocates market liberalisation and 
improved competitiveness of the EU in the globalised world.   
 
Globalisation features prominently in this representation of Europe/the EU.  The 
Greek PASOK sees the EU in the global, capitalist socio-economic context and 
expects it to be at the forefront of economic and technological development.  The 
German FDP also presents the EU as a necessary economic entity in the globalising 
world and, like the PP of Spain, emphasises the importance of the euro as a 
mechanism to guaranteeing the future of Europe.  The Hungarian Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ) also describes the EU as a free market, but to them, the EU is 
still too restricted as a market and they call for even more liberalisation and 
deregulation. 
 
The Czech Civic Democratic Party is critical of the current state of the European 
project since, as they see it, the original aim of the project is to build an open and free 
economic zone.  In other words, they see the EU taking on a less economic stance, 
and that worries them.  The implication here is that the EU as it stands is not 
necessarily good for the Czechs because it does not provide them with the right 
environment and skills. The Italian CL also sees Europe/the EU as a primarily 
economic entity but does not share the Czech critique.  The CL associates the EU with 
competitiveness, generation of wealth and creation of jobs. Europe is, therefore, seen 
as being good for Italy.   
 
While liberal-leaning parties tend to focus on the image of the EU as a competitive 
market in the global stage, parties with socialist tendencies describe Europe/the EU as 
social market economy.  Globalisation also constitutes the background to this 
representation, but the focus is not on Europe/the EU as a willing and successful 
participant in the globalisation processes but as an alternative model to construct and 
run modern society.  The images deployed in this line of argument are implicitly 
contrasted to the US model of society and, to some extent, the so-called Anglo-Saxon 
model of market and society.  The British Labour Party, therefore, cuts a lonely figure 
amongst the fellow socialist parties since their representation of Europe as social 
market economy is markedly less forceful than their continental counterparts’.   
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In the social market economic model, Europe/the EU stands for both economic 
prosperity and respect for workers’ rights, social justice and welfare (for example, the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and the SPD of Germany). This social aspect is 
deemed as both desirable and dispensable since it is envisaged to create more 
cohesion among the member states and, above all, European citizens.  In fact, the 
Greek PASOK even presents the EU as a world progressive movement that 
encourages democratisation and, at the same time, guarantees prosperity and respect 
for human rights.  According to PASOK, this is a new, European model, a model of 
which any European citizen can be proud of in the wider world.  The contrast to the 




The representation of Europe/the EU as a political entity is rarer than that of an 
economic entity.  This is not too difficult to predict given the inherent contradiction 
between the Westphalian ideals of the sovereign states and the implication of a 
political union in Europe.   
 
While it is common to associate the idealistic view of Europe with some of the 
political parties of the EU’s founding members, an equally optimistic view is voiced 
by Czech political parties. The Czech Social Democratic Party describes the European 
project as unique in the long history of Western civilisation, and also as a successful 
one.  For them, European integration is a political concept of mutual relations and co-
operation among European nations, based on each member state’s voluntary decision.  
This suggests that the party overcomes the contradiction between the nation-state and 
European integration mentioned above by focusing on the voluntary nature of the EU.  
It is a community of the willing and, therefore, it is even nobler. The Coalition also 
regards the EU as a respectable political project in which both big and small countries 
give up part of their sovereignty willingly.  It is therefore possible to support political 
union based on the principle of self-determination.   
 
The United Left (IU) of Spain describes the EU as an unfinished political project and 
calls for the creation of the ‘United States of Europe’.  The IU hangs its hope on the 
Social Charter which will, according to them, bring a political Europe by making 
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Europe a space of rights and liberty as well as a space of social rights.  A less radical 
line is followed by the UL of Italy.  The UL describes the EU as a political entity 
which gained even more robustness after the signing of the Amsterdam treaty.  The 
UL evaluates the political aspect of the EU highly because the unified legal and 
normative system across the EU territory is desirable and necessary to resolve 
disputes among the EU citizens.  It would also guarantee the protection of the EU 
citizens within the territory.  These parties solve the dilemma between the sovereignty 
of the nation-state and European integration by calling for a decentralised, federal 
structure in the EU and focus on the subsidiarity principle.  In this way, according to 
the parties, the nation/state can have it both ways: equal rights and better protection 
for the citizens and the right and power for the nations-states to run their own affairs.   
 
Europe of values 
 
In discussing Europe/the EU, political parties often bring ‘values’ into focus; that is 
Europe/the EU is often described as representing values.  These values are largely 
‘positive’ ones, a fact that indicates that European integration retains its ideological 
character in that it serves to set a particular worldview organised around a particular 
set of values.   
 
What are the values that are associated with Europe/the EU by political parties?  
Typically, democracy, rule of law, human rights and peace are cited immediately.  
The political parties in the new member states such as Poland tend to stress 
democracy which is seen as being almost synonymous with the West and the EU.  
Socialist political parties of old member states would add social market economy as a 
value that is represented by Europe/the EU.   
 
In many cases, parties call Europe/the EU a community of shared values, without 
specifying what these values.  It is often implied, however, that these values are 
related to the Christian tradition.  This is evident in the Italian UL’s and the Austrian 
OVP’s reference to ‘Christian humanistic values’ and ‘the spirit of Christian 
humanism’.  If they are not implicitly linked to the Christian background, they can be 
linked to specific national values as seen in the formulation by the New Democracy of 
Greece.  They hold values such as democracy which have originated from Greece, 
 19
thus brining the influence of the Classical period in the European project to the 
forefront.  
 
This leads to another representation of Europe: Europe as Christendom.  Reference to 
Christianity when discussing Europe is almost non-existent in the British, Czech, 
Greek and Spanish political discourses.  This representation of Europe emerges most 
frequently in the debate on enlargement.  The Polish right wing parties put an 
emphasis on the Christian heritage when portraying Europe which, combined with 
their self-definition of the Polish nation-state as a Christian one, legitimises their 
place in Europe. Poland has always been in Europe and her accession is not a question 
of ‘returning’, but rather of formalising this long-held status.  This claim is not 
contradicted by the political parties of the old member states: Poland is no doubt 
European. Christianity is flagged up as a boundary-defining element when possible 
membership of Turkey or other Muslim nations is raised in discussing the prospect of 
the EU enlargement.  The German CDU and CSU and the Italian CL are more explicit 
than others in insisting that the EU should be limited to those countries that share 
common, for instance Christian, values.  Other parties are less forthcoming in 
opposing to the possibility of, say, Turkish membership, but several Austrian parties 




Negative representations of Europe are roughly divided into two groups: Europe as a 
superstate and Europe as a capitalist conspiracy.  The former is often propagated by 
right wing or liberal leaning parties while the latter is, as easily expected, a pet motif 
for communist parties.   
 
The idea of Europe as a superstate is based on the perception that the EU is a huge 
bureaucracy riddled with unnecessary regulation and is, therefore, inefficient.  
Another understanding that accompanies the ‘Europe as a superstate’ thesis is that the 
EU infringes the fundamental principle of the Westphalian system of national 
sovereignty.  The Czech Civic Democratic Party seems to be more concerned with the 
former and sees the EU developing into a protectionist ‘Fortress Europe’ which they 
oppose.  The British Conservative Party tends to focus on the ‘red tape’ aspect, too, 
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while the UK Independence Party is clearly concerned with the question of 
sovereignty, and advocates withdrawal from the EU on the basis of protecting the 
UK’s sovereignty.  There is a wide range of variations of this view. The Hungarian 
Fidesz-MMP considers that the EU advances its own interests at the expense of 
Hungarian national interests.  The Lega Nord of Italy calls the EU a new form of 
fascism since it does not respect popular sovereignty, and the Polish LPR portrays it 
as a new form of imperialism in which the rights of weaker nations are violated.   
 
A great deal of negative assessment is imbedded in the view of Europe as the 
capitalist conspiracy expressed by communist parties across the nine countries 
surveyed in the EURONAT project.  The Austrian KPO denounces the EU for being 
both a capitalist enterprise and for contradicting the Austrian tradition of neutrality.  
The German PDS does not hesitate to describe the EU as a capitalist empire, while the 
Greek Communist Party brands the EU project as a lie, a scheme concocted by the 
oligarchic plutocracy of Europe and multinationals at the expense of the Greek people 
and advocates the immediate withdrawal of Greece from the EU.   
 
Some communist parties, on the other hand, try to portray the EU as a useful tool in 
starting social change.  The IU of Spain believes that the EU in its current form 
damages the rights of workers but concedes that it is the only alternative to full-
fledged globalisation.  While denouncing the EU as a neo-liberal project, the Italian 
RC nonetheless sees the EU as an alternative form of world class solidarity in the late 
capitalist era.  These two parties’ lines suggest that there is a way to accommodate the 
Marxist-Leninist worldview in the capitalist, neo-liberal European project.  
 
Place of Europe 
 
Since identity is always relative, the identity of Europe has to be expressed in relation 
to ‘the other’.  Data collected for the EURONAT project suggests that it is the US that 
is the most significant for Europe/the EU in the political parties’ view.  This probably 
reflects the nature of the period when the data collection took place in that it was 
marked by the attacks on the World Trade Centre buildings on 11th September 2001. 
The idea of civilisation is, therefore, often mobilised in describing both the identity of 
Europe itself and its relationship with ‘the other.’ Reflecting now the infamous ‘Old 
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and New Europe’ to a certain degree, political parties in Britain, the Czech Republic, 
Italy, and Spain, in particular, described Europe as part of ‘Western civilisation;’ that 
is to say, ‘Europe plus the US’.  Greek political parties and communist parties across 
the nine countries, on the other hand, are keener to portray Europe/the EU as a 
counterweight to the US, an actor in the international stage contributing to the 
building of a multi-polar world.   
 
Political parties’ representations of Europe/the EU show a degree of convergence 
along the ideological line.  Regardless of which member states they represent, liberal 
leaning parties tend to focus on the economic Europe and dislike practices and 
measures that get in the way of their pursuit of market liberalisation which, in their 
view, would lead to the furthering of democratisation.  Some right wing parties 
represent the EU as an emerging superstate that would infringe the right of an 
independent state.  Christian democratic parties are more concerned with the Christian 
tradition of Europe while social democratic parties are keen to represent Europe as a 
new model for marrying capitalism and social justice.  Communist parties across the 
nine countries display a similar understanding of Europe/the EU.  The majority of 
them see Europe/the EU through the prism of national interest and Europe/the EU in 
general is used to illustrate their political programme for the future. 
 
Eastern Europe or Central Europe?  Or Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
The distinction between Eastern Europe and Central Europe is not clearly articulated 
by political parties of the old member states.  The British political parties, for example, 
stick to the most politically correct expression of ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ but 
this is used in an undifferentiated way, either as a bigger market for the UK or as a 
potential source of insecurity.  Other parties of the old member states also represent 
Central and Eastern Europe as a threat – as a source of instability due to the economic 
unevenness between western and eastern parts of Europe, and as a source of 
uncontrolable immigration. Neither Central Europe nor Eastern Europe are 
differentiated but are rather put into the same category; one which is inferior to 
Western Europe both economically and sometimes socio-culturally.   
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Hungarian political parties appear to make a clear distinction between Central Europe 
- to which Hungary belongs - and Eastern Europe, and proceed to describe the former 
as the Hungarian sphere of influence. The Czech CSSD bluntly represents Eastern 
Europe as poor and insecure while some Polish parties uses the image of 
underdeveloped Central and Eastern Europe in order to differentiate Poland from 
others in terms of being the first to embark on the road of building democracy and 
free market economy. 
 
The EURONAT investigation shows that the categories of Eastern Europe and 
Central Europe are not clearly differentiated in the public discourses of the old 
member states.  The participation of the political parties from the new member states 
in the discussion of the future of Europe may bring a sharper distinction between 





From the above analysis one can begin by saying that the categorisation of Western 
and Eastern nations first proposed by Hans Kohn does not appear to have a potent 
explanatory power (Kohn 1945).  In ‘Eastern’ countries images of the nation 
projected by the political parties do not cluster around the ‘ethnic’ theme, but rather, 
they vary to a large degree.  In the ‘Western’ cases – Britain, Spain and Italy, defined 
as ‘Western’ because, according to Kohn’s formulation, they are located west of the 
Rhine - the ethnic overtone is certainly weak amongst the major and mainstream 
parties, although it has been identified in the regional/nationalist parties in Italy (Lega 
Nord) and Spain (Basque Nationalist Party).  This apparent absence of ethnic themes 
is explained better in reference to recent history than in the ways the respective nation 
was originally built. In the case of Britain, designated as a classic case of a Western 
nation in that the nation preceded the state and that the nation is conceived as an 
association of willing individuals, what seems to be even more relevant in this respect 
is the fact that multiculturalism has taken roots in British public discourse. Indeed, it 
is certainly not ‘a done thing’ to connect Britishness to whiteness or any other racial 
or ethnic categories in contemporary Britain, a proof of which can be seen in the 
overwhelming public opposition to the British National Party.  In the Spanish case, 
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the collective revulsion towards the dictatorship years somehow discourages the 
Spanish-wide political parties to present explicit images of the Spanish nation in 
public discourse and, therefore, the emphasis on the values of democracy and freedom 
comes to forefront.  The Italian case poses an interesting problem in this regard.  
Although it is geographically located in Western Europe, state formation preceded the 
nation building in Italy as famous dictum (‘We have made Italy, now we have to 
make the Italians’ - Massimo D’Azeglio) shows.  Despite the efforts made by the elite 
since unification in 1861, it is widely acknowledged that the sense of Italian ethnicity 
or nationhood remains weak.  Moreover, the lack of any ethnic overtone in the 
depiction of the nation by political parties appears to reaffirm that Italian ethnicity is 
still under-articulated so that it does not serve as a useful political tool to mobilise the 
voters.  
 
What is more important in this bird’s eye perspective on the material collected is as 
follows: the truism that the ‘nation’ is an always contested concept is supported by 
our research in the realm of public discourse because of the plurality of views 
presented in each national context.  At any given time, a number of visions of the 
nation are offered in public, and political parties are constantly fighting to win the 
support of people to their visions.  
 
The ways in which Europe is represented show more similarity than the ways the 
nation is described. First of all, in all nine national contexts, Europe and the European 
Union are more often than not used synonymously, thus, allowing the political parties 
to conflate two different images in order to support their objectives.  This may be a 
deliberate strategy taken by the parties (as seen in the idea of ‘Euro-creep’ in which 
various aspects of the EU are introduced into everyday life without attracting attention, 
thus achieving a sort of encroachment in the end) or a reflection of the everyday use 
of these two words.   
 
Secondly, the vocabulary employed when talking about Europe shows a high degree 
of resemblance among the nine cases.  With the exception of Spain, there is always a 
party or two which depicts the EU as an emerging super-state or as a potential threat 
to national sovereignty.  A typical example would be the Conservative Party of the 
UK, but it is not alone.  Very similar views are expressed by Lega Nord (Italy), albeit 
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more of a fringe party than a mainstream one, the Christian Social Union (Germany) 
and Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic), Fidesz-MPP (Hungary), and the 
League of Polish Families (Poland).  
 
The rather old-fashioned view that the EU is a capitalist conspiracy against the 
working class can still be traced in the majority of the nine countries studied.  This is 
the view propagated by political parties of a communist persuasion, such as the 
Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the former Communist party of East Germany 
(PDS), the Communist party of the Czech Republic. In Poland, the EU is demonised 
as the enemy of farmers by the agrarian Polish Peasants’ Party (PsL), thereby 
reflecting the specificity of the Polish context in the accession debate.   
 
In any of the nine countries, we find at least one political party that emphasises the 
economic aspect of European integration, and of Europe as an economic entity.  There 
are also parties, mainly of the socialist or liberal persuasion, that see the EU as a 
secular project, while other parties, especially those belonging to the Christian 
democratic camp, try to draw voters’ attention to the perceived common Christian 
background – Europe as Christendom.  The vocabulary with which ‘Europe’ is talked 
about is, therefore, shared across the nine countries. 
 
A few words about the relationship between the representation of the nation and those 
of Europe.  As observed in various places in this paper, it is fair to say that the 
representation of Europe put forward by the political parties are largely conditioned 
by those of the nation.  The overall tendency is that a political party selects images of 
Europe/the EU to satisfy its need to promote its position as the voice of the nation (or 
the nation-state).  Given that all the political parties are operating in the Westphalian 
system, this is not surprising.  In fact, the analysis presented in this paper confirms 
that there is no truly European political party emerging if we define a European 
political party as a political grouping that gives priority to the European framework in 
its is articulation of what the world is and what needs to be done.  This in turns 
suggests that there is no coherent ideology of ‘Europeanism’ emerging in today’s 
Europe.  It also suggests that the main production of the ideas of Europe is taking 
place outside the conventional political arena.  Political parties are obviously not the 
exclusive producers of the ideas of Europe, and in the analysis presented in this paper, 
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they emerge more as the consumer than the producer of these ideas and images of 
Europe.   
 
Another interesting finding in this regard is that the view put forward by the 
communist parties show more consistency than those by any other political 
groupings/alliances in regard to the relationship between the nation, Europe and the 
EU.  In their views, Europe and the EU are clearly differentiated and the relationship 
between the nation and Europe and between the nation and the EU are also set out in a 
clear terms, and this is repeated in many countries.  The universalistic nature of the 
communist ideology clearly underpins the level of coherence shown by various 
communist parties in their views of the nation and Europe.   
 
In short, an overall assessment is that representations of the nation and of Europe by 
political parties are very similar across the nine countries studied. This observation 
leads to two further speculations. Firstly, the fact that our research has confirmed that 
that there are a multitude of views of the nation and Europe suggests that these nine 
countries are now fully-fledged pluralist democracies, at least in their appearances, 
where different views are aired and fought for.  This suggestion probably has more 
relevance to the new member states than to the old member states, and lends its 
support to the view that European integration encourages the growth of democracy in 
general.  Secondly, the simple fact that every national team could identify political 
parties’ views of the nation and Europe, and the relationship between the two 
indicates that public discourse has not moved on to the post-national phase.  The 
nation (or the state, more often than not) as articulated as national interest is still the 
major reference point for the political parties in detailing their analyses of the 
situation and their suggested courses of action.  Both pro-Europe parties and 
Eurosceptic parties argue their case based on their assessment of whether or not 
Europe is favourable for the nation.  The sign that pursuing a European agenda for 
Europe’s sake is becoming the main trend amongst political parties is non-existent.  
The emergence of the long-waited-for European public space has, therefore, not 
materialised.   
 
However intriguing these speculations may be, they are issues that lie beyond the 
scope of this paper.  What we are concerned with is that although the manner in which 
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political parties represent the nation and Europe do not differ so much, support for the 
European project and the feeling of being European differ a great deal. We would 
need to come closer to each case and examine the relationship between political 
discourse and public opinion more carefully to see why this is the case.  In this 
endeavour, the concept of ideology as worldview providing a coherent framework 





                                                 
1 The nine countries are: Austria, Britain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Germany, Greece, Poland 
and Spain.  
2 Grounded theory analysis is a qualitative method aiming to capture the ‘emergent’ – the insights that 
emerge from the repetition of observation, note-taking and categorising.  This is not a method for 
hypothesis-testing and therefore is suitable for the purpose of this paper which seeks to identify 
underlying patterns in the vast amount of data.  For more on grounded theory see Glazer and Strauss 
(1967). 
3 Although the Czech Social Democratic Party refers to the long tradition of Czech knighthood to 
emphasise the longevity of the Czech nation, therefore the sacred nature of the Czech sovereignty, but 
this practice was found rather exceptional. 
4 The analysis was undertaken before the shift of government in 2004 
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Annex 
Notes on data collection and methods for analysis 
 
Austria 
Party programmes (2000-2002), speeches by key figures (2000-2002), parliamentary 
debates (on the Nice Summit of 2000, Eastern enlargement, the Kosovo war of 2000 
and Afghan war of 2001) of the Austrian People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party 
of Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Greens and the Communist Party of 
Austria.   
Method of analysis: four major dimensions of Germany collective identity were 
selected: Europe and European integration in relation to the German nation; the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU; the common European currency, and European 
military integration.  These dimensions were then analyses according to ethnic-
territorial, cultural-religious, political-institutional, socio-economic, and military-





2001 Election manifestoes from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and UK 
Independence Party collected fro each party’s web site except for the Conservative 
Party; political speeches on European affairs made by leading politicians from the 
four parties between 1997 and 200 collected from each party’s web site; 
parliamentary debates in the House of Commons over the Kosovo crisis (1999), the 
Afghan campaign (2001) and enlargement between 2001-2002 collected from the 
electronic version of the Hansard, the official record of the parliamentary debates. 
Method of analysis: Critical discourse analysis with a view to identifying various 




Party platforms released between April 2001 and March 2002 of the Czech Social 
Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Party, the Communist Party and the Coalition 
of Freedom Union and Czech Christian Democratic Union.  Opinions expressed by 
the Czech party leaders published in the Czech newspapers between March and May 
2002; Parliamentary debates on the Kosovo and Afghan crises and the EU 
enlargement. 
Method: a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis and discourse 




Party programmes (2000-2002), speeches by key figures (2000-2002), parliamentary 
debates (on the Nice Summit of 2000, Eastern enlargement, the Kosovo war of 2000 
and Afghan war of 2001) of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party, the Greens and 
the Party of Democratic Socialism.   
Method of analysis: four major dimensions of Germany collective identity were 
selected: Europe and European integration in relation to the German nation; the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU; the common European currency, and European 
military integration.  These dimensions were then analyses according to ethnic-
territorial, cultural-religious, political-institutional, socio-economic, and military-




Party platforms for the September 2002 General Election of the PASOK, the New 
Democracy Party, the Communist Party of Greece, and Synapsimos; speeches by the 
key figures of the four parties, parliamentary debates on Kosovo and Afghan crises 
and the EU enlargement.  
Method: Qualitative discourse analysis to identify representation and 





Party platforms (1998-2002) of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Hungarian Citizens’ 
Party , the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life; 
parliamentary debates (1998-2002) 




Party platforms for the May 2001 General Election of Casa delle Libertá, Ulivo, 
Northern League, Rifonazione Cammunista; Parliamentary debates on the Kosovo 
crisis (1999), the Afghan campaign (2001-2002), Eastern enlargement, Nice and 
Laeken Summits (2001-2002). 
Method: The data were analysed qualitatively with a view to highlighting how the 




Twenty-four party leaders’ speeches and party manifestoes that dealt with Polish 
identity in the European context, three parliamentary debates in which all the party 
leaders took part.   





Party platforms for the 2000 General election and 1999 European election of the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, the People’s Party, the United Left, Convergence 
and Union, and the Basque Nationalist Party; speeches by key figures, parliamentary 
debates on the Kosovo and Afghan crises, and the EU enlargement. 
Method: combination of content analysis and contextual analysis facilitated by 
Atlas/ti. 
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